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Introduction
Globalization has brought unprecedented progressive change to society. The world has become
significantly more connected with new technologies able to link individuals from across the
world almost instantly, and people are more mobile than at any point in history (Blommaert
2010). On a deeper level, globalization has also brought about progress in terms of cultural
awareness, acceptance, and understanding, surpassing societal and geographic borders. More
than ever before, individuals from different backgrounds, nationalities, ethnicities, religions,
cultural viewpoints, and beliefs are converging on a daily basis in even the most remote areas of
the planet, sometimes in person, often online creating communities based on affinity (Gee 2005)
and reassembling the social (to paraphrase Latour 2005). Though generational changes have led
to growing acceptance of this convergence of cultures and differences, work remains to be done
in the area of human rights and equality. Indeed, historical responses of tension and violence are
still realities in some societies and cultures today where outward differences, or internal
differences once unveiled, are viewed as threatening, and where there seems to be little
movement towards progress.
The topic of human rights has risen in prominence over the last 70 years, though the very
notion rests on the ideas and movements of previous centuries regarding the dignity and morality
of the human condition. Various periods throughout history, such as the French Revolution and
two World Wars, though plagued with violence and a lack of understanding, have sparked
dialogue and action with the aim of combatting widespread incivility and injustice and bringing
human decency and equality to the forefront. In many instances, new societies and governments
(e.g., those of the US and France) were created on the basis of these new ideas, which inspired
and set the groundwork for subsequent movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement of the
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1950s and 1960s and the Gay Rights Movement, demanding respect and freedom for all. In
many ways, these movements throughout history, such as the French Enlightenment, precipitated
the modern human rights movement and the wide variety of documents – legal, cultural, or
otherwise – now surrounding it. Although the concept of human rights seems to be very
straightforward, it is certainly not one that is static or concise. Since World War II, the push for
universal human rights has accelerated significantly, and today, human rights laws and doctrines
are still continually altered to account for the complexities and limitations that emerge from the
fact that hardly any situation can be dealt with in exactly the same manner as another.
In recent years, one of the most contentious human rights issues has been lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights. Even in the most progressive societies, including those
in Western Europe and the United States, the issue of same-sex marriage and full civic equality
in many facets of life remains vastly contested, and human rights for LGBT individuals have
only recently become highly salient. In some nations, the situation is quite dire as LGBT
individuals are persecuted and sometimes even sentenced to death for “sinful” homosexual
behavior. In countries such as the US and France, such capital punishment does not exist. Still,
many anti-LGBT interest groups stand up in staunch opposition to LGBT rights, and the LGBT
community is still denied full equality. Many countries, however, are making inroads in granting
such civil liberties as marriage and adoption to LGBT individuals. One such country that has
recently instituted a law legalizing gay marriage is France, and the whirlwind of events
surrounding the passage of “Mariage Pour Tous,” or “Marriage for All,” is notable. Although it
appears that full equality in this area has been attained, a certain loophole in the “Taubira Law,”
as it is known (owing to the current Minister of Justice, Christiane Taubira, who championed the
law), indicates otherwise. A “circulaire,” or memorandum, signed only a few weeks after the
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passage of Mariage Pour Tous, indicates that if one member of a same-sex partnership in France
holds citizenship in one of eleven countries, mostly those formerly a part of Yugoslavia and
those of the Maghreb in northern Africa, the couple cannot, in fact, marry in France due to
bilateral agreements indicating that the laws of these countries must be upheld for nationals of
those countries residing in France.
In the following thesis I will examine complications surrounding the quest for human
rights in developed, western societies by examining this particular exception to marriage equality
law in France. The persistent push for non-excludable human rights continues, but, as is evident
by this particular loophole, is difficult to attain even in societies self-proclaimed as bastions of
human rights and equality. My thesis will answer the following question: What are the
challenges of advancing equal rights for LGBT individuals in an increasingly diverse society? I
will answer this question by examining the case of the French Taubira Law (Loi n° 2013-404 du
17 mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe), also known as
Mariage Pour Tous. I will begin by providing background and historical context of human rights
legislation in France pertaining to LGBT individuals. I will pay particular attention to the
passage of Mariage Pour Tous. Next, I will describe the law in some detail, paying special
attention to challenges it faced as well as the context of the loophole. I will conclude with a
discussion of why the loophole exists, and, more importantly, its implications for the future, with
special attention to the persistent challenges that face LGBT rights advocates.
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Background: Why France?
Before analyzing why France provides for such a unique case study in terms of marriage equality,
it is necessary to understand the nation’s cultural context. The idea of a French “national identity”
is a recent construct that made little sense until the French Revolution and has been contested
since due to the multitude of different “regional” identities that have existed on the French
territory. These identities were manifested in a variety of regional languages including Basque,
Normand, Breton, Alsatian, etc. that corresponded with different cultures existing within French
territories not frequently penetrated by others. During the French Revolution, countrymen from
these separate cultures allied together to topple the oppressive monarchy of Louis XVI. The
revolutionary period was one of extreme economic, political, and cultural change based largely
on the ideals of the Enlightenment, which laid the foundation for modern France (Allen and
Dubreil 19). Emerging from the French Revolution, and also heavily inspired by the ideals of the
Enlightenment period, came the Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen, an attestation
of the human and civil rights of French citizens. This marked one of the first formal recognitions
of such rights in the world. Given that universal human rights do not exist despite the presence of
a Universal Declaration of Human Rights drafted and codified by the United Nations, ubiquitous
recognition of national human rights in France was not a reality after the passage of the
Declaration. While the new form of French identity emerged – that of a “French citizen” as
opposed to Normand, Basque, etc. – the notion of universal respect and understanding was still
far from recognized.
During France’s colonial period, it became clear that the ideals of the Declaration on the
Rights of the Man and the Citizen were not intended to extend past France as “the White Man’s
Burden” was a prevalent mindset of those in positions of power in the French government. Many
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saw it as the moral duty of France to bolster the development and position of lesser-developed
countries by spreading Christianity and the culture of the West (the so-called “mission
civilisatrice de la France”). In 1884, then French Prime Minister Jules Ferry declared, "The
higher races have a right over the lower races, they have a duty to civilize the inferior races"
(Fordham) The idea of the inequality of human beings and the moral superiority of French
citizens, despite the nation’s constitutional verbiage in the Declaration on the Rights of the Man
and the Citizen, was ever-present, even in the highest ranks of the French government. Today,
the view is less a disparity between races and nationalities and more a lack of self-monitoring in
the realm of human rights. France and other developed western countries view themselves as
bastions of human rights and equality, so they do not as frequently question possible domestic
transgressions in this area.
As globalization has engendered the swift and continual osmosis of peoples from all over
the world across borders, immigration has become a much more prevalent reality in France (as
elsewhere). For over a century, the identity of France rode upon the idea of a particular image of
a French collective of white, Catholic, and, obviously, French citizens. The immigration of
people from other countries, language groups, religions, and cultures has rendered France’s
idealized national identity (as introduced during the Napoleonic Era) more complex. The
assimilation of regional identities that once existed is now happening on a much larger scale as
migrants from countries around the world are coming to France, and the French ideal of
assimilation is becoming much more problematic (Heckmann 15). In France, unlike the United
States, there is no widespread notion that immigrants can come and retain their cultures and ways
of life easily. Instead, immigrants are expected to transform themselves into “French citizens” in
order to be fully accepted into modern French society (Heckmann 15).
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National assimilation is certainly a political question in France. “Through its universal
and abstract ambitions, the [French] Revolution implied that all those who adhered to the
nation’s values, in particular human rights, could all become its members” (Heckmann 15).
Although this influx of immigrants has engendered many opportunities for those groups in
France, it has also incited a lot of friction in French society. France houses more than 7 million
immigrants; approximately one in nine people living in France are considered to be immigrants
(Allen and Dubreil 136). The various cultures and ethnicities brought in through this constant
influx of individuals are becoming enmeshed within and are intertwining with existing French
culture. This new diversity becomes problematic considering the French prospect of assimilation.
The idea of “minorities” exists much less in France than in the United States. For example, in
France there is no widespread belief that multiculturalism and individual ethnic cultures “should
remain in the private sphere and should not be recognized in the public domain“ (Heckmann 15).
A 2004 law banning forms of religious symbol or dress in public schools exemplifies this.
Following the French Revolution, the nation largely rescinded its staunchly Catholic past and
elected to follow a more secular future based on the precept of laicité, more or less the separation
of church and state, which it continues to espouse today. Although it is certainly much less
difficult for groups to immigrate to France than to other nations such as the United Kingdom or
the United States, the stipulation of assimilation is significantly more institutionalized.
This problem of assimilation with what is understood to be “French” rests not only with
diverse ethnic and religious groups, but also with other minority groups. For example, the
problem of assimilation exists for LGBT individuals as well as racial, ethnic, and religious
minorities. Until fairly recently, sexual orientation other than heterosexuality was another
minority status that was considered best left to the private domain in France. With globalization
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inciting the immigration of various ethnic and national groups to France, it has engendered
incredible opportunity but also incredible friction. Washing in with this wave of globalization is
a notion of acceptance for diversity regardless of identity. Furthermore, with the rise of the
European Union, there is an additional friction on the potential of a new “European” identity
emerging (Bruter 2005). With the possibility of entirely new identities emerging, many French
citizens are choosing to unofficially relinquish their status as solely “French,” instead electing to
assimilate into additional identities of Breton, Muslim, atheist, in a relationship of someone of a
different nationality or religion, and even gay. The identity of being “French,” as in many other
globalizing western nations, is now unavoidably expanding beyond simply being a white,
heterosexual Catholic who was born and raised in France.
Not everyone in France is so quick to warm up to such overarching and drastic changes,
however, and this reality has incited debate not only at the social level but also at the legal and
political level. Those who welcome this diversity and change argue that the framework that
exists in France is behind reality. France is home to the largest number of Muslims outside of the
Middle East and Asia, yet France stands to force them to hide any public indication of this. The
number of homosexuals who live in France is staggering, yet the debate of civil equality persists.
Now many are standing up to assert equal rights the same as any other French citizen. There are
those, however, who stand to suppress such progressive and liberal reform in the name of the old
French framework: in the name of a nuclear family, Catholicism, tradition, and simply being
“French” as it used to mean. If such debate and friction still exists in France, a nation considered
to be one of the most liberal and progressive in the world, the global potential for fully
recognized human rights is likely far from being reality.
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Historical Context
The history of France has been marked by a long list of violent episodes. The close proximity of
France to many other countries in Western Europe has engendered tension and violence
throughout the country’s long history. Virtually all Western European countries have had
contentious pasts with “The Other” – those who speak different languages, come from different
villages, possess a different religion, and, certainly, homosexuals. As for France, its strong
Judeo-Christian roots not only have incited wars of religion and other tensions with surrounding
groups but also engendered systemic homophobia that continues to this day: repression in the
name of criminal sin and “indecent behavior.”
French society is not traditionally viewed as repressive. Although pre-revolutionary
society consisted of suppression in virtually all aspects of life for those who were not a part of
the nobility, the French Revolution brought about drastic change in the structure of society.
During the Ancien Régime, homosexuality was a capital crime that was punishable by burning at
the stake. Very few individuals had to endure the full penalty of partaking in homosexual activity,
however, and many arrested for the act were simply imprisoned for a few weeks (Corriveau and
Roth 2011). With the invalidation of established religion following the Revolution, the National
Constituent Assembly introduced the Penal Code of 1791, which decriminalized homosexuality
and repealed all laws against sodomy. This revamping of French Civil Law did not make
changes uniquely for homosexuality, however, as it invalidated many crimes whose creations
were inspired by established Christianity, such as blasphemy (Backer). Sibalis 1996 outlines:
In his presentation of the newly drafted penal code to the Constituent Assembly, Le
Pelletier de Saint-Fargeau commented that it outlawed only 'true crimes' and not 'those
phony offenses created by superstition, feudalism, the tax system and despotism.'
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Although he did not list the crimes 'created by superstition' -- meaning the Christian
religion -- they undoubtedly included blasphemy, heresy, sacrilege, and witchcraft, and
also quite probably bestiality, incest, pederasty and sodomy. By dropping any mention of
these former offenses, Revolutionary legislation simply passed over in silence acts that
had once, at least in theory, merited the most severe penalties [including death] (Sibalis
82).
The Penal Code of 1791, however, did not mention private same-sex behavior; this particular
aspect was not addressed until twenty years later.
Much of the basis for modern French Civil Law lies with the Napoleonic Code, which
was written in 1804 by Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès, a French lawyer and statesman who
was openly gay. Following the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Code privatized
homosexuality and removed it from direct regulation (Corriveau and Roth 2011). The vagueness
of the code, however, allowed legal authorities to continue to exert homophobic authority over
homosexual behavior (Corriveau and Roth 2011). Although homosexuality was officially
decriminalized, authorities with an aversion to it used the vague verbiage of the code to their
repressive advantage.
Since Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès was gay himself, it is understandable that many
believe he was responsible for eradicating the criminalization of homosexual individuals;
however, the true revamping of Civil Law did not come until the Penal Code of 1810, which
dealt specifically with sexual crimes (Butterworth). Although deemed legal by the Code,
homosexuality was not widely accepted in wider French society at the time. It was still viewed as
intensely immoral, and many homosexuals were still persecuted by Napoleonic officials not
under charges of sodomy or homosexual behavior but on more vague charges of immorality and
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public indecency (Butterworth). Despite these repressive actions, this era was “a time of relative
freedom for homosexuals and opened the modern era of legal toleration for homosexuality in
Europe” (Merrick 1996). Napoleon’s conquests spread and imposed the principles of his Penal
Code throughout Europe including Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. Other states not under
Napoleonic rule, such as Bavaria and Spain, still followed Napoleon’s example and
decriminalized homosexual activity in their own states as well (Merrick 1996). Most specifically,
the Penal Code established sexual conduct as a private matter.
Although there was never any harsh and extraordinary opposition to or push for LGBT
rights and equality in France through the 19th century and early 20th century, the most
overarching liberal reforms came in the 1980s with the administration of François Mitterrand, the
21st President of France who served from 1981 to 1995. Mitterrand was a member of the
Socialist party and is today still widely considered to be one of the most accomplished western
liberal leaders. Mitterrand is not considered to be a great and impactful leader simply because of
the longevity of his administration – 14 years – but, more importantly, due to the widespread
liberal reforms that he instituted in the country. He sought to nationalize French banks and
businesses in order to improve worker pay, worked to combat unemployment, and also
successfully abolished the death penalty (“François Mitterand”). In terms of advancing LGBT
rights in France, Mitterrand equalized the age of consent for homosexual activity early in his
administration in 1982. The beginning of his administration occurred during a period of great
change in the world of marriage in France. The social movements of 1968 introduced these new
liberal ideas only 10 to 15 years earlier, and this new manner of thought was continuing to unroll
(Martin and Théry). The increase in the number of couples cohabitating and births outside of
wedlock indicate a new acceptability and also perhaps a renunciation in the social necessity for
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traditional marriage, a so-called “soft revolution” (Martin and Théry 12). During his
administration, various project proposals to advance the cause of LGBT equality were put
forward by the left including the partenariat civile (Senate, 1990) and the contrat d’union civile
(National Assembly, 1992), noteworthy though not terribly significant advancements (Martin
and Théry 16). The Mitterrand administration set a wave of socially liberal policies that gave
way to many more to come following his years in office.
A few more proposals were put forth and passed in the National Assembly in the few
years after Mitterrand left office, but perhaps the most notable liberal establishments towards
advancing LGBT rights in France came in 1999 when the PaCS, or the Civil Solidarity Pact
(Pacte Civil de Solidarité), was voted into effect by the French Parliament. The PaCS is
officially defined as, “a contract between two adults, of different or of the same sex, intended to
help organize their life in common. It entails both rights and obligations for both partners,
especially ‘mutual and material support’” (Consulate General of France). It still remains a
prominent institution in French society today and was passed largely to advance the cause of
LGBT couples by offering a legal recognition of their union but not quite to the extent of actual
marriage. Approximately 94% of those who choose to register a PaCS are homosexual (Wullus).
Often, couples can even participate in a formal ceremony for a PaCS, and, passed only in the past
few years, couples who sign off on the PaCS agreement are considered “pacsés” in terms of
official marital status rather than “single” as they were considered for the first six or seven years
of the institution’s existence (Godard).
The PaCS debate exhibited a noteworthy change in French public opinion, and many
viewed traditional family associations as too conservative to represent their interests, which now
lied in the realm of individualism, secularism, and equality (Martin and Théry 26). The
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“homosexual community,” now more commonly referred to as the LGBT community, an
emerging interest group, though fragmented and decentralized, began to make inroads gaining
power and prominence on the French social, political, and legal agenda (Martin and Théry 10).
Despite staunch opposition from many angles and an intense debate in the National Assembly,
the PaCS (loi sur le concubinage et le pacte civil de solidarité) was signed into law on
November 15, 1999 and still exists as a social and legal institution and option for both
homosexual and heterosexual couples today (Martin and Théry 15). The PaCS is not, however,
intended to be legal recognition for homosexual couples as “legal couples.” Furthermore, it is
also only intended to be concluded between cohabitating couples. Around the turn of the 21st
century:
homosexuals who want to conclude a legal union [did not] have in France the equal rights
and dignity [that existed], through registered partnerships, in other European countries
like Denmark or Sweden. Marriage, now possible for same-sex couples in the
Netherlands, [was not at the time] considered a serious legal issue by French politicians,
in spite of the efforts of some very active leaders of the homosexual movement” (Martin
and Théry 22).
Although then, and even now, there were couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, who were
satisfied with the advantages obtained from a PaCS, including inheritance and housing rights as
well as social security benefits (“Benefits and Obligations of a PACS”), there were many
homosexual couples who were still not content and sought further equality. The hunger for full
equality and human and civil rights amongst the LGBT community in France was far from
satisfied.
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Mariage Pour Tous
Loi n° 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe
Although the passage of the PaCS presented significant gains in terms of LGBT couple rights in
France, the debate over equality was not over. In 2004, Noel Mamère, former presidential
candidate and leftist mayor of Bègles, a suburb of Bordeaux, conducted a marriage ceremony for
a same-sex couple. He stated that there was nothing in French law officially prohibiting it, and
furthermore stated that should anyone oppose it, he would uphold his actions in the European
Court of Human Rights. He stated that he wanted to take a stand and “fight all forms of
discrimination, including homophobia” (“First gay marriage held in France”). The event sparked
widespread media coverage, and both pro and anti-gay groups flooded the city to applaud and
protest. The PaCS was the only means for homosexual couples to enter into a civil union with
one another; however, it still does not grant adoption, lineage, or custody rights (“Benefits and
Obligations of a PACS"). Then Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin insisted immediately
following the ceremony that, under French law, marriage only be between a man and a woman,
and that the marriage performed by Mamère would be declared null and void, which it was soon
after (“First gay marriage held in France”). This event sparked a more specific debate on the
front of LGBT equality in France, focused not generally on the rights of individual homosexual
individuals or couples, but more precisely on the right to marry.
In 2006, entering into the debate were concerns regarding the rights of children in such
circumstances of same-sex marriage. In a parliamentary report released in January of the same
year regarding the family and rights of children in the nation, writers emphasized the desire to
understand and acknowledge the evolution of and current state of the modern French family in
order to best keep with the interests of the children of the country (Assemblée Nationale). The
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report seemed, at least in its phrasing, to be somewhat open to a “new” conception of the family
stating, “The civil code contains no definition of the family. Article 213 affirms that, ‘spouses
assure together the moral and material direction of the family. They provide for the education of
their children and aid in preparing for their future” (Assemblée Nationale). The code of social
action and families emphasized the diversity of family forms in providing three different criteria
for what would constitute the character of a family in Article L 211-1. These included families
created by marriage and filiation, married couples without children, and “all physical people with
legal burden of having children by birth or adoption, or having custody or guardianship of a child
or children under their effective and permanent responsibility” (Assemblée Nationale). The final
category was undeniably added, though not comprising a “traditional” family, to include singleparent households, particularly since almost half of the children in France were born out of
wedlock at that point and the marriage rate was down 27 percent compared to 35 years earlier
(Schuck). It was argued, however, that same-sex couples are not included within any of the
categories (Assemblée Nationale).
A poll by nationally renowned Figaro magazine in August 2006 indicated that a majority
of French citizens supported the idea of legalized gay marriage in the country. The debate was
highly polemical between separate corners of the government. Then current President Jacques
Chirac, a conservative, spoke publicly against it, while left-wingers, such as current president
and then Socialist part leader François Hollande, were pushing for full equality of homosexual
couples with heterosexual couples (Schuck). The debate continued for five more years, with new
LGBT associations forming and existing ones gaining support and traction. These associations,
towards the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011, urged the Constitutional Council to review the
Constitution and the Civil Code to determine whether the prohibition of same-sex marriage in
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France was unconstitutional or not. The Council determined that the illegality of same-sex
marriage in the country was not, in fact, unconstitutional, and determined that it was a question
better suited for the French Parliament (Conseil Constitutionnel). Thus, a few months later in
June of 2011, the National Assembly voted on Bill 586, the first bill regarding the legalization of
same-sex marriage to be voted on by the French parliament. With a right-wing majority in the
parliament, the vote came out decidedly against the legalization of gay marriage, 293 votes to
222. The Socialist party, those who voted overwhelmingly in support of the bill, stated that,
should they gain the majority in the next election, the legalization of gay marriage would become
a distinct priority in their administration ("French Parliament Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Bill").
In the subsequent national election the following year in 2012, Socialist party leader
François Hollande, who had expressed his support for the legalization of same-sex marriage in
France early on six years before, emerged as victor. As the party had promised the previous year,
his administration included the legalization of same-sex marriage as well as the possibility of
adoption for same-sex couples as high on their political agenda. As with the PaCS that came
thirteen years earlier, the debate for full same-sex civil marriage divided the citizens of France.
The protests and demonstrations that surrounded both sides of the gay marriage debate were
much more widespread and gained significantly more media attention. Hollande made the issue a
cornerstone of his campaign and was pushing for a law to be passed by mid-2013, and the
legislation was presented to Parliament in January of 2013. The law “allows marriage for all,
regardless of sexual orientation. This [means] gay couples – who have had the right to civil
partnerships since 1999 – could, through marriage, take their partner's name and gain inheritance
and pension rights. Adoption would also become legal for married same-sex couples” (Chrisafis
7 Nov.). Hollande hoped that, should this law be passed, it would be a “milestone of social
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progress,” and particularly, a progressive paradigm-shifting piece of legislation with his name on
it (Chrisafis 14 Dec.).
Whether the bill was presented due to the progressive intentions of Hollande or as a
distraction from the French financial crisis that was happening at the time, or perhaps a mix of
both, the Constitutional Convention blocked opposition to the bill from right-wing groups in
May, giving Hollande the go-ahead to sign it into law (“France Gay Marriage: Hollande Signs
Bill into Law”). Loi n° 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes
de même sexe (Law n. 2013-404 of May 17th, 2013 opening marriage to same-sex couples) was
signed in mid-May of 2013 and came to be known as “Mariage Pour Tous,” or “Marriage for
All.” Many also refer to it as the “Taubira Law” due to the actions of Christiane Taubira, current
French Minister of Justice and staunch advocate for minorities, in setting the movement for
LGBT equality in motion and introducing the law. On May 17th, 2013, France became the ninth
European country and the twelfth country in the world to legalize same-sex marriage (“Le
Mariage Pour Tous”). The decision proves, however, to be the most influential of all countries
authorizing same-sex marriage in terms of economic and diplomatic consequence (Chrisafis 7
Nov.).
Article. 143: “Marriage is contracted by two opposite-sex or same-sex individuals” ("Loi
N°2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 - Article 1"). The legal acknowledgement of marriage equality had
finally been made. Furthermore, “Mariage Pour Tous” is unique amongst policies legalizing
same-sex marriage in that the law provides for adoption for same-sex couples as well. Although
quite a significant step towards equality for the nation in providing gay and lesbian couples the
primary marriage rights they had been seeking, the law was not as generous as it seemed. The
law only offered homosexual couples the right to adopt if they were married, ignoring the desire
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of the countless couples “pacséd,” or those simply in a civil union. Furthermore, the law does not
provide for medically assisted procreation for same-sex couples, married or otherwise. Many
equality groups were still unsatisfied after the law was passed since it still did not provide for full
equality (Chrisafis 14 Dec.) Many could argue, however, that, despite the stipulations and
nuances of parenthood for same-sex couples that the law either did or did not provide for, the
issue of marriage equality for all, “Mariage pour Tous” as the law’s namesake exhibited, was
finally resolved.

Challenges to Equality
The passage of the PaCS was hotly contested in last few years of the 20th century,
particularly by right-wing politicians who believed that providing such a right to LGBT couples
would prove destructive for French society. Nevertheless, “homosexuals increasingly demanded
social recognition of their partnerships and legal protection [and] the debate about PaCS was a
result of that mobilization” (Godard 8). Due to the successes of the Socialist party and the close
political proximity of many of the homosexual associations to the party, which was in power at
the time, it was much easier for the debate to be placed on the political agenda (Godard 8). The
debate over the PaCS incited significant questioning on the “frontiers of the family,” most
notably led by MP Christine Boutin, who spearheaded the “Pacs out” campaign (Martin and
Théry 20). “To recognize the right of homosexuals to live in partnerships and to obtain legal
advantages equivalent to those of “legitimate” couples, and to break with discriminatory attitudes
and homophobia leads ineluctably to the acceptance of homosexuality as a legitimate way of life
and even as a form of family life” (Godard 8-9). The homosexual movement gained significant
traction in the mid-90s due to a party in power with great fertility to advance the cause and
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strong grassroots mobilization (Godard 9). The debate ranged on a variety of homosexual issues,
from recognition of the individual to recognition of the rights of homosexual couples to debates
involving and surrounding adoption (Godard 9). On all issues, family associations and right-wing
associations defended tradition (Godard 9 and Commaille & Martin, 1998).
At the time Hollande assumed Presidential office in 2012, a poll conducted by national
newspaper Le Monde indicated that 65 percent of French citizens were in support of same-sex
marriage, but the backlash and protest that emitted from the political and social conservatives,
namely the Catholic Church, was intense (Chrisafis 7 Nov.). Cardinal André Vingt-Trois, the
archbishop of Paris, stated that legalizing same-sex marriage would “shake the foundations of
[their] society” (Chrisafis 7 Nov.). The strong opposition to the law from the Catholic Church
and from right-leaning individuals on the basis of religion was also surprising considering the
secular nature of French government and society. Simply the introduction of the bill in late 2012
sparked widespread street demonstrations surrounding the passage of the law, which revealed the
profound divisions that existed in French society on the issue.
One of the largest associations in France that arose in opposition to the potential passage
of Mariage Pour Tous, “Manif Pour Tous,” or “Protest for all,” garnered a strong support
network that still maintains power and influence in France today. Manif Pour Tous is not a
specifically homophobic association, nor an association with the predominant goal of countering
the legalization of gay marriage in France. Rather, their mission is to uphold the values of the
traditional family, which it views the legalization of gay marriage in France as considerably
jeopardizing. “[…] we bear a historic responsibility…for preserving our civil statuses, our
society, and our humanity, let us stand up with determination, with no homophobia […] to
demand that this bill be withdrawn” (La Manif Pour Tous). The organization’s primary qualm
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with Mariage Pour Tous is that it “intends to erase sexual differentiation and complementarity
from the law and jeopardize the foundation of human identity: sexual difference and the resulting
structure of parentage” (La Manif Pour Tous). Their primary concern is children raised in a
familial situation other than what is “traditional” and accepted – i.e. one father and one mother.
“With plenary adoption for two men or two women, children will be considered, by law, born of
two parents of the same sex, thus willingly deprived of a father or a mother. They will be
deprived of half their origins. This is profoundly discriminatory and unjust for children” (La
Manif Pour Tous). What is interesting to note, however, is their apparent lack of consideration
for single or otherwise non-traditional heterosexual parents, and their willingness to advocate for
something arguably discriminatory and unjust for one group for the “benefit” – in their
assessment – of children. The two issues of gay marriage and adoption, however, for protesters
on both sides, remain indivisible.
Perhaps it is the differences in the variation in the conceptions of marriage in general
between the two sides that sparked so much controversy and protest. For example, Manif Pour
Tous alleges:
Marriage is always a choice for couples. As current wedding statistics show, many
choose a different way of living their relationship, such as a PaCS (a type of civil union)
or cohabitation. To recognize this diversity of life choices for both heterosexual and
homosexual couples is to recognize marriage as a particular and demanding choice,
which has no pretension to be universal. As society has progressed in its acceptance of
homosexual couples for what they are, so it must recognize marriage for what it is (La
Manif Pour Tous).
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Furthermore, “Marriage is not a consecration of love [...] the law [Mariage Pour Tous] makes
distinctions between different types of couples with respect to familial stability. That is the point
of republican marriage. The "differences in treatment" lawfully recognized in this context are not
discriminations, but serve the well being of children and families” (La Manif Pour Tous). Manif
Pour Tous, and many of those protesting against the legalization of gay marriage in France, was
protesting on behalf of the family – the potential of homosexual couples adopting children – not
simply in stark opposition to gay marriage itself. Those protesting in support of the legalization
of Mariage Pour Tous, however, were likely more specifically in support of the institution of
marriage being made legal to two individuals in love, regardless of their gender identity or sexual
orientation, and secondarily the ability of those couples to adopt and raise children, though not as
a primary motivation for protest. It was Manif Pour Tous’s strategy in framing their movement
as a movement for all French citizens that likely aided in their success in garnering so much
support.
The political landscape in France grants significant power to non-governmental
organizations and associations who provide significant steam in influencing public opinion as
well as motivating activity both counter and pro government policy. This very democratic aspect
of power of the people engenders widespread manifestations, or public protests, regarding a
variety of issues in France, but few have been as notable or as extensive as those surrounding the
passage of Mariage Pour Tous. In early 2013, one of the largest demonstrations occurred in Paris
in the hopes of countering the advancement of the bill. Over 340,000 anti-gay marriage
protesters rallied through the streets as well as 125,000 of those in support of same-sex marriage.
Manif Pour Tous fueled much of the demonstration on the anti-side, which shocked many
observers since strong protest backing typically comes from the political left (Schofield).
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Furthermore, with relation to France’s political system, existing institutions dictate that,
regardless of whether or not there is a religious marriage ceremony conducted, couples wishing
to wed must have a civil ceremony either as the sole ceremony or in addition to one that is
religiously conducted (Schofield). Since, in many other nations, religiously-based ceremonies are
also considered to be valid by the state, it is likely that conservatives in France expressed so
much discontent with the law because legalizing gay marriage would fully equate with
heterosexual marriage, perhaps, in their opinion, somehow downgrading or slightly illegitimating
their own conception of marriage.
As the bill progressed slowly but surely through the National Assembly and moved onto
the Senate in the last few months before it was ratified, protests intensified on both sides, with
much of the heat emitting from right-wing groups. SOS Homophobie, a pro-gay non-profit
association, “received three times as many reports” of homophobic violence and incidents in the
months leading up to the passage of Mariage Pour Tous compared to the year prior ("Anti-gay
Marriage Rally Keeps Debate Alive in France"). Inching closer to potential ratification, gay bars
were attacked, “anti” protesters breached barricades on the Champs-Elysees, and the “National
Assembly president received a letter containing gunpowder and a threat of war signed by
unknown ‘social forces of order’” (Pathe). Through it all, many protesters asserted, to the likely
surprise of many uninformed onlookers, that they are certainly not homophobic but simply
concerned about homosexual couples adopting with the well-being of children raised by samesex couples at stake. Even when the bill was signed into law in May of 2013, Manif Pour Tous
protests did not relax, and the anti movement determined not only to keep the debate alive but
also to aim to reverse the law entirely during the next election cycle ("Anti-gay Marriage Rally
Keeps Debate Alive in France"). With the National Front party faring quite well in terms of
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citizen support, the potential, even though the 2014 election cycle has since passed, of rescinding
the law is never far from being a possibility.
Although protests still continue on the part of Manif Pour Tous and other right-wing
groups aimed at countering Mariage Pour Tous, they have relaxed for the most part. Homosexual
couples in France are able to enter into civil unions, marry, and even adopt children. On the
exterior, it seems only fitting that proponents of gay rights should be celebrating the
achievements that have been made in the arena. Though certain privileges for gay couples
remain unresolved such as medically assisted procreation, it seems that those in support have, by
and large, won the gay rights struggle. As the history of human rights predicts and validates,
however, the struggle for full equality is never truly over. Recognizing the universality of human
rights is an unavailingly elusive goal, and even though full attainment seems so much closer
today, it's still not quite achieved. Even after much of the public protest has, for the most part,
died down, a very small challenge to full LGBT equality in France remains. The loophole
described in the memorandum on Law 2013-404 dated May 29th, 2013, signed only twelve days
after Mariage Pour Tous was signed into law and by the same justice minister, Christiane
Taubira, prevents full LGBT marriage equality from being a reality in France.

The Loophole
Circulaire du 29 mai 2013 de présentation de la loi ouvrant le mariage aux couples
de personnes de même sexe (dispositions du Code civil)
Less than two weeks after the law legalizing same-sex marriage in France was passed, Decree
No. 2013-429 of May 24th, 2013 amended various provisions regarding Loi n° 2013-404 du 17
mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe, or “Mariage pour Tous,”
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relating to civil status and the Code of Civil Procedure with immediate application. The 29-page
memorandum outlines various amendments to the gay marriage law, not specifically outlined
within the law itself. The memorandum upholds many of the benefits intended by the law, such
as equal treatment of both homosexual and heterosexual married couples and parents and inserts
such in the new Article 6-1 of the Civil Code. Although much of the first part of the
memorandum is directed at the parentage of same-sex couples and related intricacies, it indicates
a few important stipulations to the fundamental legalization of gay marriage “for all.”
The memorandum states, “Apart from the requirement related to sexual otherness, which
is no longer required, the legislation opening marriage to couples of the same sex does not
change any of the other substantive requirements for a valid marriage in France” ("Circulaire du
29 mai 2013"). Section 2.1.2 of of the the memorandum, however, introduces a few surprising
exceptions to the newly passed law, drawing on Article 202 of the Civil Code “to adjust the
difficulties related to conflict of laws, where the planned marriage has foreign elements”
("Circulaire du 29 mai 2013"). Specifically, Article 202-1, paragraph 2 stipulates, “Two people
of the same sex can marry when at least one of them, either by personal law or the law of the
state in which he has his domicile or residence, permits it” ("Circulaire du 29 mai 2013").
Essentially, the new law granting same-sex couples the right to marry applies to couples residing
in France in which at least one of them is a citizen of France. The law cannot be applied,
however:
to nationals of countries with which France is bound by bilateral agreements, which
provide that the applicable substantive conditions of marriage law is the personal law. In
this case, because of the hierarchy of norms, such conventions have a value above [law
2013-404] and should be applied in the case of a marriage involving one or two
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national(s) of the countries with which these agreements were concluded. In the state of
right and jurisprudence, personal law will be dismissed for nationals of these countries
("Circulaire du 29 mai 2013").
Such bilateral agreements were signed between France and the following 11 nations: Poland,
Bosnia and Hertzogovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Slovenia, Cambodia, Laos, Morocco,
Tunisia, and Algeria. In cases where two individuals of the same sex should attempt to marry in
France and in which one of them is a national of one of these 11 countries, the civil officer will
be unable to lawfully perform the marriage.
The memorandum lists the relevant conventions signed between each individual country
and France but does not outline the particulars of the agreements and conventions that would
necessitate such an exception to the same-sex marriage rule. It does, however, list specific
articles and paragraphs of the conventions that directly contradict the application of Mariage
Pour Tous for said citizens. Many of the bilateral conventions signed between France and the 11
nations were validated in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, indicating long-standing legal and
historical ties between the nations that persist today and retain considerable importance. In the
context of the entire memorandum, however, the explanation for this particular aspect regarding
nationals of the particular 11 countries is quite vague, so reading the original bilateral
conventions is required to better understand why such a barrier exists for citizens of these
relevent countries.

Entangled Histories
When taking a closer look at the eleven countries whose homosexual citizens in France are
prevented from marrying, the list comes at no surprise: each of the eleven comprises a region of
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the world with which France has a long-lasting and fairly active diplomatic relationship. The
eleven countries all fall within one of three principal regions of French interest: Southeast Asia
(Laos and Cambodia), North Africa or the “Maghreb” (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), and
Eastern Europe/former Yugoslavia (Poland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo,
and Slovenia).
During 19th century, at the beginning of France’s colonial prime, France extended its
colonial reach into Southeast Asia. What began as religious mission work in the region and a
means to protect the Catholic religion eventually turned into military and colonial expansion
(Tucker 1999). In 1859, the French captured Saigon in Vietnam, the first of its Southeast Asian
pursuits. In the fifty years that followed, France moved north and completed its conquest of
Indochina by 1907 (Wilson). French Indochina, which came to be known as the Indochinese
Union and later the Indochinese Federation, comprised the grouping of French colonies that
existed in the region, including the nations of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and parts of China. The
primary reasons for colonization in the region were economic as the early colonial government
had almost exclusive control over the trade of opium, salt, and rice alcohol. Natural resources
eventually became extremely important as well as rubber (“Effects of French Colonial Rule”).
As a result of the over half-century of colonization in the region, the French culture, French
language, and Catholocism penetrated the region, and left its mark for years to come.
French colonial acquisition specifically in Cambodia, the first in the two Southeast Asian
nations in current question with Decree No. 2013-429, began in the mid-late 19th century. When
France established its first Southeast Asian colony in present-day Vietnam, King Norodam of
Cambodia requested a French Protectorate be established over his kingdom, which was initiated
in August of 1863 (“Effects of French Colonial Rule”). Under the treaty signed that initiated the
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establishment of the Protectorate, much of the power of the Cambodian monarchy was ceded to a
French Resident-General. France was interested in the territory because it would serve as a
useful “buffer colony” between its Vietnamese colonies and Siam, in addition to providing
military protection of the country, was also placed in charge of Cambodia’s foreign and trade
relations (Franchini 92). Although France’s acquisition of almost complete power in the region
was met with backlash from time to time, it began to make inroads both in Cambodia and in the
region as a whole.
In 1893, following a victory in the Franco-Siamese War, the nation of Laos, the second
nation in question in the current gay marriage law in France, was added to France’s colonial
sphere of influence in the establishment of the French Protectorate of Laos. Interest in the nation
began in the 1860s with the mission of utilizing the Mekong River to reach southern China
(Hahn). After the Protectorate was established towards the end of the 19th century, a ResidentGeneral or “Resident Superieur” was established, as in Cambodia, to organize the administration
of the colony (Hahn). There were a few mild uprisings regarding French colonial rule in the
country, which were quickly quelled, but Laos was an overall relatively passive colony. World
War II placed France at a highly disadvantaged position in terms of retaining control of French
Indochina, particularly with regards to Japanese presence in the region. Japanese surrender in
1945, however, put France in a position of regaining Indochina, and they were able to do so the
following year (Hahn). Over the course of the next seven to eight years, many of the French
actions taken in its Indochinese colonies were aimed at relinquishing power back to the native
people, and in 1953-1954 full independence was granted to all colonies previously in French
Indochina, Laos and Cambodia included.
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A few years following independence in 1959, a formal decree (décret n° 59-593 du 22
avril 1959) was published outlining the formal agreements made between each of the now
independent Indochinese nations, notably those made between France and Cambodia on August
29th and September 9th of 1953 and that made between France and Laos on October 22, 1953.
The decree outlines the various transfers of judicial authority granted from France to the newlyindependent nations ("Laos Convention Bilatéral"). Regarding power transfer protocol between
France and Cambodia/Laos, it was agreed to that the French government “transfers to the Royal
government [of Cambodia and Laos] all expertise performed to date in the territory regarding
judicial matters […] regarding all litigants of the French courts in Cambodia” ("Laos Convention
Bilatéral" 68). These decrees acknowledge the transfer of judicial authority over Cambodian
citizens over to the judicial courts of Cambodia from the judicial authority of the French courts.
In a letter exchange between the High Commissioner of the French Republic in
Cambodia and the Cambodian Prime Minister, High Commissioner Risterucci asked Prime
Minister Phnom-Penh how conflict of laws would be dealt with by the new independent nation,
to which Phnom-Penh replied, “ […] the royal government intends to apply the rules of private
international law to resolve conflicts of law that may occur before the Cambodian courts. The
personal status of nationals of the French Union shall, following the rules of private international
law, fall to their national law” ("Laos Convention Bilatéral"). Such an exchange of letters
between the two individuals has the value of an international treaty in and of itself ("Mariage
Homosexuel. Situation Des Couples Binationaux"). Article 19 of the agreement between France
and Laos outlines that, particularly in those cases related to marriage, “[…] in all cases where the
laws of conflict will not be provided by Lao law, they will be resolved according to French rules
of conflict of laws” ("Laos Convention Bilatéral" 34). Although certain provinces in Cambodia
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now recognize lesbian partnerships as marriages, Cambodian national law does not recognize
same-sex marriage, and Article 1 of Lao marriage law defines marriage as between a man and a
woman ("LGBT Rights in Laos").
France’s colonial relationship and history with Southeast Asia was long and involved, but
the vast distances that separated France from the region prevented the nation from having a
durable influence in numbers, culture, and governance. France’s colonial relationship with the
countries of northern Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), commonly refered to as the
“Maghreb,” however, is significantly more intertwined and ripe with prominent conflicts,
perennial issues, and persistent influence today. Separated only by the Mediterannean Sea, the
Maghreb and France have a very close relationship, arguably closer than even that of the
Maghreb and the rest of Africa. Though the context of France’s relationships with each of the
three nation-states – all three of concern to Mariage Pour Tous – is quite similar at the base in all
three cases, in-depth study reveals distinct differences between the three.
“If we view the process of colonialization as a wound – which many Maghrebian writers
do – we must conclude that Algeria’s wound was deeper and more painful than that of its North
African Neighbors, Morocco to the west and Tunisia to the east” (Mortimer 2000). Before
France ventured into Southeast Asia to satisfy its deep oriental colonial pursuits, it did not
venture far to begin its colonial acquisition in northern Africa. France began its conquest of the
Maghreb in 1830 with Algeria, the second largest country in Africa (today) and geographically
five times the size of France (Walker). With economic pursuits in mind, French troops
mercilessly entered Algeria, and many European civilians, mainly working class individuals –
French migrants were officially dubbed “pied noirs” or “black feet” – entered into Algiers, the
capital ("French Algeria 1830-1962"). Rather than being established as a protectorate or colony,
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Algeria was declared actual French territory. The pied noirs in Algeria were able to participate in
French elections, but Algerians were not granted the same rights. The French exploited the
resources and land to the benefit of the French state, arguably to the detriment of the natives of
the colonies.
Once France initially stepped foot into Algerian territory, the backlash was strong and
prevalent. Abd al Qadir, considered one of the first champions for Algerian independence during
the 1830s and 1840s, built up a strong and notable backing of support to counter French
occupation, but he was defeated in 1847. Over the course of the next century, France upheld a
strong military presence in the region, both discouraging and halting any resistance movements
that arose. During this time, the native Muslims of Algeria were considered to be “subjects” of
the French state and were not permitted to “obtain French citizenship unless they gave up their
religion and culture” ("French Algeria 1830-1962"). The situation was arguably a form of
Apartheid with the pied noirs receiving all benefits in terms of habitation, employment, etc.,
while the native Algerians were marginalized in almost every case. Algeria’s economy was
exploited to support the French Republic as virtually all crops and resources were exported to
France. It is likely due to French colonization and exploitation that Algeria did not fully
industrialize and remains to be a “lesser-developed” state today. France had overstepped
boundaries in a variety of areas in Algerian society, and in November of 1954, revolutionaries
comprising the National Liberation Front, or FLN, initiated the Franco-Algerian War, or the
Algerian War of Independence. The war, lasting less than a decade, exhibited the power and
brutality of the French military, but they were seen as far from legitimate. Then President
Charles de Gaulle, though met with hot opposition from many French citizens, decided to rescind
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control over the Algerian territory in 1961, and with the 1962 Evian Accords, Algeria was
granted independence.
Although the circumstances in France’s two other Maghreb colonies of Tunisia and
Morocco were certainly not as entrenched and bloody as they were between France and Algeria,
the effects of French colonization were still profoundly felt. Both Tunisia and Morocco are
significantly smaller nations in terms of both territorial scope and French economic interest. The
political situation was also much less fortified in Tunisia and Morocco than in their sister nation
of Algeria. Economic interest in Tunisia was significantly less than that in Algeria, so the
conflict was minimal. Furthermore, Morocco was only considered to be a protectorate, so they
retained their own local government and administration. The two nations experienced a much
shorter period of French colonization than neighboring Algeria, and independence came quicker
to them. As in Southeast Asia, World War II made possession of colonies to be significantly
difficult for France, and it granted independence to Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 without much
tumult (Tarwater 4).
Tunisia was the first of the three Maghreb states to have a convention signed between
leaders outlining the conditions of independence. Decree n. 58-86 of February 1, 1958,
publishing the judicial convention between France and Tunisia, was signed on March 9, 1957.
Upon the legitimation of this convention, Article 1 states that “the French courts in Tunisia are
dissolved, and all skills once assigned to them are now assigned to the Tunisian courts” (Décret
N° 58-86 du 1er février 1958 2). Furthermore, Article 2 states, “In matters or personal status, as
defined by the Bey’s decree of July 12, 1956, French nationals are governed by their own law”
and “in all civil, commercial, and, by default, Tunisian matters, the French text in force in
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Tunisia at the date of application of this convention will continue to apply before Tunisian
courts” (Décret N° 58-86 du 1er février 1958 3).
Four years later, France solidified Algerian independence with the Evian Accords, which
were the result of negotiations between France and the now independent Algerian state, officially
ending the Algerian War and outlining the intricacies of Algerian independence ("Accords
d'Evian"). The convention underscored the necessity for Algeria to be a signee of the Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Man as well as the necessity to found “its institutions on democratic
principles and on the equality of the political rights between all citizens without discrimination
on the base of race, origin, or religion” ("Accords d'Evian"). Sexual orientation, of course, had
not yet been added to the list. The 2013 memorandum outlining the particular Mariage Pour Tous
loophole indicates the “declaration of guarantees” as the particular aspect of the Evian Accords
trumping Mariage Pour Tous in this case. Point six of the third part indicates that in terms of a
personal status, French citizens residing in Algeria as foreigners will be governed by French law
("Mariage Homosexuel. Situation Des Couples Binationaux"). Furthermore, “French nationals
exercising Algerian civil rights can not simultaneously exercise French civil rights” ("Accords
d'Evian"). The principle of reciprocity exists within these conventions, necessitating that
Algerian law apply to Algerians ("Mariage Homosexuel. Situation Des Couples Binationaux").
Although the previous two conventions of Tunisia and Algeria do not explicitly outline
same-sex marriage as prohibited in terms of laws under which nationals of each individual
country fall under, the convention between France and Morocco, published significantly later in
the early 1980s, directly mentions marriage. Morocco was granted independence in the late
1950s at the same time as Tunisia, but the convention cited as directly prohibiting homosexual
Moroccan nationals from marrying in France is not the initial convention outlining the terms of
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independence. Rather, the convention cited is the “Convention relating to the status of people
and the family and to judicial cooperation dating August 10, 1981” (published by Decree No. 83435 of 27 May 1983, Article 5). Though an initial convention exists outlining the conditions of
independence, this convention was ratified more recently to explicitly delineate the rules on
conflict of laws related specifically to marriage and family amongst nationals of France and
Morocco. Article 1 states, “The status and capacity of physical persons are governed by the law
of the State in which such persons are nationals” (“Convention entre la Republique Française et
le Royaume du Maroc”). Chapter 1 Article 5 of this particular decree, indicated as the contingent
factor of this loophole in the 2013 memorandum, states that “the conditions at the base of
marriage such as marital age and consent, as well as impediments, particularly those arising from
kinship or marriage, are regulated for each spouse by the law of one of the States which they are
nationals” (Convention entre la Republique Française et le Royaume du Maroc”). Marriage laws
for each individual, regardless of the nationality of their partner, fall to the laws of the state for
which they hold nationality. Thus, Moroccan LGBT individuals wishing to marry French citizens
are prohibited from doing so because Moroccan marriage law prohibits same-sex marriage.
The last grouping of nations affected by conventions rendering same-sex marriage in
France still illegal for their nationals are all located in Eastern Europe. These countries, including
Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Slovenia, have a much less
direct relationship with France, however, than their Southeast Asian and North African
counterparts. These six nations, all but one comprising part of former Yugoslavia, were never
French colonies, and the bilateral conventions signed between France and them do not treat the
subject of newly given self-determination from France and the resulting intricacies. Although
there is no extensive or noteworthy historical information regarding relations specifically and
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solely between France and Poland, the past 100 years have shown drastic changes in PolishFrance relations. After World War I, France and Poland enjoyed amicable relations as political
and military allies. When Germany invaded Poland twenty years later at the start of WWII,
however, relations between the two nations strained because France refused to aid floundering
Poland. Once the war concluded, Poland and France relations did not improve but worsened as
the contries found themselves on opposite sides of the political ideological spectrum (Buhler).
France was capitalist, and Poland was communist.
In 1969, during the height of the Cold War, a convention was signed between the France
and Poland, outlining laws specifically relating to the rights of individuals, especially on family
matters, of the two states. Specifically, the convention aims to develop the relations of the two
countries in the judicial domain. Pertaining to the memorandum in question, it lists Article four,
paragraphs two and three as prohibiting the application of Mariage Pour Tous to homosexual
Polish nationals in France. The statements indicate, “The conditions at the base of marriage are
those of the law of the High Contracting Party in which the members of the couple are nationals”
(“Décret n. 69-176 du 13 février 1969”). Furthermore, “If one of [them] posesses the nationality
of one of the High Contracting Paties and the second of the other, the conditions set out in
paragraph two for each obey the law of the state of which he [or she] is a national” (“Décret n.
69-176 du 13 février 1969”). Thus, same-sex couples in France in which one of them is a Polish
national are prohbited from marrying despite France legalizing same-sex marriage.
The other Eastern European nations included in the memorandum comprise the nowdissolved nation of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia emerged as a communist nation following World
War I. During the war, many Yugoslavian intellectuals came to France to train militarily or study.
In the thirty years following World War II, the number of Yugoslav immigrants to France almost
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tripled from 20,000 before the war to over 70,000 in the mid-1970’s (Boskovic) . In the years
following 1960, the primary motive for Yugoslavian immigration to France was economic. The
economic crisis in their home country necessitated leaders to allow Yugoslavian citizens to
pursue temporary work in other countries. Between 1965 and 1975, approximately one million
people left Yugoslavia, many of them to work and reside in France (Boskovic). Likely due to
the influx of Yugoslavian individuals to France, in 1971, France and Yugoslavia signed a
bilateral convention relating specifically to the rights of people and families between the two
nations. Article four of the convention specifically references marriage and includes almost
identical wording as the conventions between France and the other aforementioned nations. “The
qualities and conditions required for marriage are regulated, for each spouse, by the law of the
contracting party to which he [or she] is a national. […] However, the requirements for kinship
and alliance are also governed by the law of the contracting party whose authorities celebrate the
marriage” ("Mariage Homosexuel. Situation Des Couples Binationaux").
When Yugoslavia was disbanded with the fall of communism in the early 1990s, the
now-sovereign nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Slovenia
emerged. The former bilateral convention between France and Yugoslavia remained, however,
and was reinforced in the form of letters between France and each of the new individual states.
The letters are spread out over a decade (March 28, 1994 for Slovenia (Decree No. 96-229 of 15
March 1996); March 26, 2003 for what was then Serbia and Montenegro (Decree No. 2003-457
of 16 May 2003), December 3, 2003 for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Decree No. 2004-96 of 26
January 2004); September 30, 2010 for what was then became the Montenegro (Decree No.
2012-621 of May 2, 2012); and February 4 and 6, 2013 for Kosovo (Decree No. 2013-349 of 24
April 2013). Each of these letters upholds and reaffirms the stipulations on marriage law that
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were first introduced in the French-Yugoslav convention, thus preventing homosexual nationals
from said countries from marrying a French individual in France. Gay marriage is not legal in
any of the former Yugoslav republics nor Poland, so homosexual nationals are still prohbited
from marrying in France, even though their partner is French and they are not residing in their
nation of origin.
Although the context of the bilateral agreements between France and the 11 nations
varies greatly, most speak of a “personal status,” or marital status, that can only be determined
by their nation of origin. Thus, if same-sex marriage is not recognized in their home nation, even
though they are residing in France, the passage of Mariage Pour Tous does not benefit them. The
original goals of said bilateral conventions were certainly not to aim to prevent homosexual
nationals from said countries from marrying should France eventually legalize same-sex
marriage, but due to the intricacies of the international legal landscape, certain phrases within the
conventions are interpreted as contradicting Mariage Pour Tous in their application. Thus, one
can reasonably interpret Mariage Pour Tous, Marriage For All, as clearly not being for all.

Questions and Consequences
Although the number of bi-national same-sex couples wishing to marry in France, in which one
is a national of one of the 11 aforementioned nations is likely few (though an exact number is
indetermined), the overarching consequences of such bilateral conventions are severe for such
couples. The memorandum ultimately put into question the state of human rights in France and
developed countries today.
In one specific instance, French citizen Lise and her Polish girlfriend Agnieszka were
excited about finally having the opportunity to marry after being together for years, but when
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they went to the town hall in France, they were prohibited from marrying. Due to the 1967
bilateral convention outlined above between France and Poland, “a French magistrate would
have to overrule Polish law to approve the wedding” (Ng). Although the initial intentions of the
bilateral conventions were not discriminatory in nature in and of themselves, the resulting legal
intricacies and arguably discriminatory consequences of them over 50 years later are still being
felt. "They cannot put people in a different category just because of their nationality,” Agnieszka
stated in her RFI interview (Ng). When such instances arise, however, the 2013 memorandum
indicates that, “Officials must therefore refuse to marry these couples, and send the case to a
magistrate, who will then decide on a case-by-case basis” (Ng). Thomas Fouquet-Lapar,
spokesman for Ardhis, a French association that provides support for foreign gay and transsexual
individuals in France, indicated:
Some people [and] the government tell us that, in reality, we can overlook the ministry’s
document. And today, magistrates have handed down favourable decisions to FrenchAlgerian couples, French-Tunisian couples, and maybe tomorrow it will be the same for
all the 11 nationalities affected. But why make people go through the legal system instead
of making things simpler? French law should be applied the same way across France with
no exceptions, so the ministry’s document must be rewritten (Ng).
This particular legal formality implies significant subjectivity. One can infer that most relevant
cases would be sent to the magistrate, who has the power to determine whether or not the
marriage should be performed. It is worth examining the potential consequences in terms of
foreign legal relations between the two nations if a same-sex marriage would disrupt normal
amicable relations between France and one of the relevant 11 countries, but if the magistrate has
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a personal philosophy that contradicts the legalization of same-sex marriage, it is difficult to
believe that they would be willing to grant an exception if there is a form of legal barrier in place.
In Southern France, an official refused to marry a same-sex French-Moroccan couple. In
court, the couple argued that France had for years ignored the aspect of Moroccan marriage law
that prevents non-Muslims from marrying Muslims. In such a case where a Muslim woman from
Morocco was prevented from marrying a non-Muslim man in France, the courts established that
the bilateral convention between Morocco and France would not be upheld because it
contradicted French law (Ng). It seems only sensible that a case involving the marriage of a
same-sex couple of both French and Moroccan nationalities should be upheld as well. The
available evidence remains inconclusive as to why this double standard exists. Furthermore, the
bilateral convention between Morocco and France outlined above states, “The law of one of the
States designated by this Convention may be refused by the courts of another State unless it is
manifestly incompatible with the public order” ("Convention entre la Republique Française et le
Royaume du Maroc”). One could argue that preventing a same-sex couple from marrying in
France in which one of the partners is Moroccan is incompatible with the established public
order of human rights and equality in France, yet the contradiction remains. It might be
reasonable to conclude that since Mariage Pour Tous was only recently adopted two years ago,
the legal system simply has not caught up. Only time will tell if this is the case.
One of the most interesting and seemingly contradictory aspects of this particular
memorandum is that Christiane Taubira, the current Minister of Justice in France and champion
of minority rights in France and primary proponent of Mariage Pour Tous, was also the signatory
of the memorandum, barring certain same-sex couples from marrying in France. In an inquiry set
forth by Senator M. Jean-Yves Leconte in June of 2013, approximately a month after Mariage
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Pour Tous was instated, the Senator directly poses questions regarding the memorandum to Mme.
Taubira. He inquires as to the consequences of simply rejecting “hierarchy of norms” upheld by
the May 29th memorandum that contradict Mariage Pour Tous for nationals of the
aforementioned 11 countries. He mentions that “to interpret things, in the case of nationals of
countries of the European Union such as Poland and Slovenia, is to practice, on national territory,
discrimination with the general principles of EU law of non-discrimination of nationals EU by
the Member States. This principle is incorporated in a treaty that has been ratified” (“Mariage et
Loi Personnelle”). Furthermore, he states that “personal law,” which many of the bilateral
conventions cite, is “not an inviolable principle in France,” and that in the case of the five
nations formerly a part of Yugoslavia, France never formally signed bilateral agreements with
them. Simple letter exchanges are upheld as valid documents in terms of international law.
Taubira acknowledged the validity of Leconte’s concerns in her respone, but stated that
for the 11 nations indicated, the bilateral agreements were fundamentally different than those of
over one hundred other countries examined. In such bilateral agreements, it was explicitly stated
that the “personal law” of those nations cannot, in any circumstance, be infringed upon by
French law. This stipulation was instated to protect the nations during decolonization.
Furthermore, no revision of the bilateral agreement with former Yugoslavia is expected. Taubira
acknowledged the fact that a judge, should he or she wish, can state that the marriage ban is
contradictory to established French public order. She seemingly contradicts herself, however, in
stating, “I agree that it is unsatisfactory to rely on court decisions. However, we must respect our
domestic law and international law. Hence the meaning of this memorandum” (“Mariage et Loi
Personnelle”). It seems that if she agrees that cases should not be under the jurisdiction of
individual judges then there should not be a memorandum that grants them subjective power.
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Regardless, she hints at her and her office’s determination to nullify the obstruction to full
equality but that it will certainly not be immediate as there are no revision dates scheduled for
any of the conventions.
Leconte mentions that Belgium uses contracting parties to determine which law should
apply in particular circumstances, and that this could potentially be a viable solution for France.
On the other hand, France could simply just declare these conventions as conflicting with French
public order (“Mariage et Loi Personnelle”). These conventions, however, offer protections on
many different fronts, and it is difficult to rescind the validity of one particular point and not
inherently ignore the entire document, which could lead to problems on the diplomatic front.
Futhermore, it could also be concluded that the potential backlash that might result from ignoring
this aspect of the bilateral conventions between France and the 11 nations would cause more
harm and difficulties for the nation than the civil rights of only a handful of same-sex couples in
France are arguably worth.
Although the 2013 memorandum lists the particular articles and paragraphs of each
bilateral convention between France and the 11 nations that specifically or indirectly prohibit the
validation of Mariage Pour Tous for gay and lesbian nationals from those coutries, many
questions remain unanswered. For instance, although France held the Southeast Asian colonies
of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, Vietnam is not included as an affected nation in the
memorandum for unclear reasons. Moreover, under which state’s laws are homosexuals who
hold dual citizenship considered? For instance, if a French gay man wishes to marry a man with
both Tunisian and French citizenship, would the two be able to successfully marry without legal
barriers? Does it matter with which nation he has his original citizenship, or does current
habitation trump initial citizenship? Would this be another case left up to the subjective opinion
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of the French magistrate? Neither the bilateral conventions nor the memorandum are specific in
this particular aspect.
Due to the relatively small number of same-sex couples in France that this particular
loophole affects, this exception to the rule has gone relatively unnoticed in France and in the
larger context of global LGBT equality. “Mariage pour Tous” has provided marriage equality
rights to most, but, as exhibited by this particular exception, clearly not to all. The quest for full
human rights and equality, despite the passage of Mariage Pour Tous in France, is not as
straightforward and simple as it seems. France, though certainly not the first nation to legalize
same-sex marriage, is viewed as one of the beacons of human rights in comparison to the rest of
the world. If arguably one of the most socially progressive nations in the world still does not
guarantee full human rights to its inhabitants even after passing Mariage Pour Tous, then the
virtuous goal of global human rights seems pervasively elusive. Although the passage of Mariage
Pour Tous was a significant step towards granting more rights to individuals, barriers still remain
for many. If human rights are not granted to all individuals, then are they are they truly rights or
should they be considered, to paraphrase George Carlin, privileges instead? Though many are
celebrating such advancement in French policy, others argue that it still is not the guarantee of
full marriage equality that it should be. Mariage Pour Tous, “Marriage for All,” is, some could
say, a misnomer, as it still is not for all. As is indicated in this particular case, the fight for full
equality is hard and perpetual, and France and the rest of the “developed” world in particular still
have much to do before they can truly live up to their potential as beacons of human rights and
equality.
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